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Abstract
Background: The general practitioner contracting initiative (GPCI) is a health systems strengthening initiative
piloted in the first phase of national health insurance (NHI) implementation in South Africa as it progresses towards
universal health coverage (UHC). GPCI aimed to address the shortage of doctors in the public sector by contracting-
in private sector general practitioners (GPs) to render services in public primary health care clinics. This paper
explores the early inception and emergence of the GPCI. It describes three models of contracting-in that emerged
and interrogates key factors influencing their evolution.
Methods: This qualitative multi-case study draws on three cases. Data collection comprised document review,
key informant interviews and focus group discussions with national, provincial and district managers as well as GPs
(n = 68). Walt and Gilson’s health policy analysis triangle and Liu’s conceptual framework on contracting-out were
used to explore the policy content, process, actors and contractual arrangements involved.
Results: Three models of contracting-in emerged, based on the type of purchaser: a centralized-purchaser model, a
decentralized-purchaser model and a contracted-purchaser model. These models are funded from a single central
source but have varying levels of involvement of national, provincial and district managers. Funds are channelled
from purchaser to provider in slightly different ways. Contract formality differed slightly by model and was found to
be influenced by context and type of purchaser. Conceptualization of the GPCI was primarily a nationally-driven
process in a context of high-level political will to address inequity through NHI implementation. Emergence of the
models was influenced by three main factors, flexibility in the piloting process, managerial capacity and financial
management capacity.
Conclusion: The GPCI models were iterations of the centralized-purchaser model. Emergence of the other models
was strongly influenced by purchaser capacity to manage contracts, payments and recruitment processes. Findings
from the decentralized-purchaser model show importance of local context, provincial capacity and experience on
influencing evolution of the models. Whilst contract characteristics need to be well defined, allowing for
adaptability to the local context and capacity is critical. Purchaser capacity, existing systems and institutional
knowledge and experience in contracting and financial management should be considered before adopting a
decentralized implementation approach.
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Introduction
Universal health coverage (UHC) is a fundamental
health system goal and a key target of the health-related
sustainable development goal (SDG) [1–3]. In recent
years South Africa (SA) arrived at a policy decision to
progressively realize the attainment of health for all in
SA in part through a 14-year phased introduction of
UHC using National Health Insurance (NHI) as the fi-
nancing mechanism [4].
Contracting private sector providers to render services
to uninsured public sector patients was one of four
streams of a “PHC re-engineering” strategy that sought
to strengthen delivery of primary health care (PHC)
services at district level in preparation for the future
introduction of NHI [5]. An initiative, referred to in this
paper as the ‘GP contracting initiative’ (GPCI), was de-
signed to contract-in private sector General Practitioners
(GPs) to render services in the form of time-bound
sessions in public sector PHC facilities.
Health policy and systems research (HPSR) aims to
explore the “what”, “how” and “why” of policy develop-
ment and implementation [6]. Documenting the GPCI
using existing health policy analysis frameworks, this
paper provides detailed accounts of three models of
contracting-in and lays a foundation for forthcoming
publications that will provide further in-depth analysis
on the GPCI. Comparing the different models that were
piloted in different locales provides rich information that
could potentially guide policymakers’ future strategies
for engaging non-state actors in SA, as well as in other
similar settings, as they progress towards UHC.
Background
Defined as access to quality health services for all citi-
zens [3, 7], UHC encompasses both provision of the full
range of quality essential health services according to
need and protection from financial hardship due to
out-of-pocket payments for health services [3, 8].
SA has a two-tiered health care system that is com-
prised of a public sector, primarily funded through tax
contributions, and a private sector funded through med-
ical schemes (private health insurance), hospital care
plans and out-of-pocket payments (OOPs) [9, 10]. This
system results in inequitable access to care for the popu-
lation. The impact of disparate health care financing and
resourcing between the sectors is evident across eco-
nomic, racial and geographical strata, [11, 12] and is
illustrative of the inverse care law [13–17]. In 2014, total
health expenditure accounted for 8.5% of Gross Domes-
tic Product (GDP), with about half (4.3%) spent in the
private sector that serves only 18.1% of the population
[12, 18, 19]. In 2008, per capita spending by private
medical schemes was found to be more than five times
higher than in the public sector [9]. The costs of health
care services, as well as spending, vary significantly be-
tween the two sectors.
Although voluntary private medical schemes mainly
cater to high- and middle-income formal sector em-
ployees, the law requires that members receive a pre-
scribed minimum benefit (PMB) package of health
services [9, 10, 20]. Private health care providers are typic-
ally remunerated by medical schemes on a fee-for-service
(FFS) basis, with scheme members incurring OOP expen-
ditures for services not covered under the PMB package.
The uninsured population is primarily dependent on the
public sector for health services. However, evidence
suggests that uninsured low-income workers frequently
access private providers directly for primary care services
such as general practitioner (GP) consultations [9, 10, 21]
thus also being subject to OOP payments.
The introduction of NHI is an endeavor that is likely
to involve significant health financing reforms aimed at
pooling revenue to improve cross-subsidization; it also
seeks to use economies of scale and strategic purchasing
to achieve cost-efficiency. An NHI fund will eventually
be established as a single-payer and single-purchaser to
purchase health care services from a mix of private and
public providers [22].
The first phase of SA’s effort to attain NHI focused on
health systems strengthening aimed at improving the
quality of health services in the public sector and ad-
dressing structural imbalances, including public sector
human resource shortages [4, 23]. To this end, the
Ministry of Health (MOH) developed a plan to achieve
better population-based health care outcomes by
strengthening the PHC services delivered through the
District Health System [24]. Contracting private sector
providers to render services to uninsured patients was
one of four streams of “PHC re-engineering” [5]; General
Practitioners (GPs) were the first cadre of health care
professionals to be contracted through the GPCI. This
study explores the early implementation of the initiative.
The history of contracting health care providers in South
Africa
Contracting of GPs into SA’s public sector has in fact
been implemented for many years in various forms.
Prior to 1994, the “Part Time District Surgeons” (PTDS)
programme contracted private GPs to provide FFS PHC
services in their own practices with the aim of providing
access to care particularly in rural hard-to-reach geo-
graphical locations [25]. These contracts faced challenges,
including administrative difficulties, and MOH concerns
about quality of services and abuses of the system by doc-
tors due to insufficient levels of oversight [25, 26]. These
issues, coupled with patient concerns regarding quality of
care and equity [25, 26], eventually resulted in the discon-
tinuation of the programme after 1994.
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The GPCI pilot commenced in 11 NHI pilot districts
in early 2013, with the purpose of testing different
models of contracting-in in various contexts. The policy
intent of the GPCI is to address health care personnel
shortages in the public sector, and specifically to increase
access to quality health care in rural and isolated geo-
graphical areas. The national shortage of doctors has
been well documented. With an estimated 76.7 doctors
per 100,000 population in the country [27], SA seems to
compare relatively favorably to the average physician
density for other low-and-middle-income countries
(LMICs) (80 per 100,000) [27]. However, notable dispar-
ities exist between the public and private sectors [28].
One analysis estimated that there were 25.1 GPs per
100,000 population in the public sector, compared to
92.5 per 100,000 population in the private sector in 2013
[29]. Therefore a key intention of the GPCI was to draw
on the better-resourced private sector, to fill gaps in the
public sector’s human resources. The GPCI can be
described as a formal spoken policy. It was implemented
as a pilot in order to identify implementation model(s)
that could potentially be scaled up during the phasing in
of NHI, and to identify best practices for future applica-
tion. To date, however, the models have not been
described in detail nor has any formal evaluation been
conducted.
During the inception and early implementation of the
GPCI, three distinct models of contracting-in emerged.
Using existing health policy analysis frameworks, this
paper seeks to (1) describe the three models of
contracting-in, (2) describe the inception of GPCI and
its introduction into the South African public health
sector, and (3) identify key factors that influenced the
early emergence of these three models, with a focus on
contextual, contractual and actor-related factors.
Methods
Theoretical frameworks
We used Walt and Gilson’s health policy analysis
triangle [30] as the primary analytical framework to
explore the policy content, contexts, processes and ac-
tors involved in the development and early implementa-
tion of the GPCI, in order to describe how the three
models emerged and which factors influenced their evo-
lution and characteristics. To enable a more explicit
examination of the contractual arrangements and actors
involved in each of these models, we incorporated Liu’s
conceptual framework on contracting-out [31] within
the overarching Walt and Gilson framework. Although
not specifically adapted for contracting-in, Liu’s frame-
work guided our review of the features of a formal con-
tract: type of services, contract formality and duration,
provider selection, provider payment mechanisms, speci-
fication of performance requirements and characteristics
of the purchaser and provider as actors, as well as how
these changed over time [31].
Research design
This paper draws on qualitative data that were collected
as part of a larger mixed methods study exploring the
implementation of the GPCI, the actors involved, and
the interactions among them. The broader study
involved analysis of secondary data and qualitative data
collection. Secondary quantitative data were used to in-
form case selection for this qualitative multi case-study.
A case study design enables the in-depth exploration of
a phenomenon, such as the GPCI, within its context,
and through a variety of perspectives using multiple
sources of evidence [32, 33]. We selected multiple case
studies to enable exploration of differences within and
between cases (models) [33]. We purposively selected
three case study districts to represent three of the nine
GPCI pilot districts. The districts represented various
contexts in which the GPCI piloting was taking place:
one urban densely-populated well-resourced district, one
rural sparsely-populated district, and one rural but
relatively well-resourced district that represented a
mid-point between the other two (Table 1). Primary
qualitative data collected at national, provincial and
district levels were used to describe the inception of the
GPCI, the three types of contracting models that
emerged and the factors that influenced the emergence
of these models.
In interviews with national-level policy-makers, the
three models of contracting-in being piloted were
revealed: centralized-purchaser, decentralized-purchaser
and contracted-purchaser models. The contracting model
thus became an additional key factor influencing the pur-
posive selection of districts for study. Data were subse-
quently collected from Districts A, B and C. During data
collection in the latter two districts it became apparent
that two contracting models were being implemented
concurrently in both. Hence the three districts no longer
represented distinct cases as originally envisioned when
the study was designed. The boundaries of the case studies
were therefore redefined during the analysis phase to
address the three contracting models. The three cases pre-
sented in this paper thus examine the three contracting
models currently in existence, as presented in Table 1.
Data sources
For the broader study, qualitative data comprised docu-
ment review, key informant interviews (KIIs) and focus
group discussions (FGDs) with national, provincial and
district managers and general practitioners taking part in
the GPCI. Documents reviewed included published and
unpublished documents obtained from official websites
and provided by key informants. These included policy
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documents relating to NHI, GPCI progress reports, con-
tracts and job descriptions.
Participants for KIIs were purposively sampled at
national, provincial and district levels based on their
position, knowledge of and involvement in NHI gener-
ally and specifically GPCI policy formulation and imple-
mentation. Snowballing was used until saturation was
reached. Purposive sampling was also used to obtain a
range of perspectives across the various levels of the
health system and contexts in order to obtain an
in-depth understanding of this initiative. The research
team engaged with the GPCI coordinator in each district
to identify key stakeholders involved in district level
implementation given that it was envisaged that the lat-
ter would differ by context.
Three FGDs were conducted with purposively selected
district-level participants (including the District Manager
and key District Health Management Team (DHMT)
members) based on their active involvement in GPCI
implementation. It was envisaged that different DHMT
members would be responsible for different aspects of
implementation of the GPCI, such as recruitment, con-
tracting, placement, training and orientation, supervi-
sion, performance management and payment. The FGDs
thus aimed to collect information on: the coordination
of the GPCI at district level from the perspective of the
DHMT, how the DHMT members interacted with each
other to implement the initiative, challenges experienced
and any gaps in DHMT capacity to oversee the contract-
ing process. GPs for KIIs were selected through stratified
random sampling. A list of all contracted GPs was
obtained from each district. The GPs were stratified by
sub-district and then randomly selected. A total of 56
KIIs and three FGDs were conducted. Seven respondents
refused to participate, the reasons for which are un-
known (Table 2).
To describe and explore the emergence of the models
for this paper, we drew primarily on qualitative data
from national, provincial and district-level KIIs and
FGDs. Data from the GP interviews were used to cor-
roborate data from managers’ describing how the models
operate in practice.
Table 1 Key characteristics of case study districts
DISTRICT A DISTRICT B DISTRICT C
Contracting model
Contracting model(s) Decentralized-purchaser Contracted-purchaser
Centralized-purchaser
Contracted-purchaser
Centralized-purchaser
Demographics
Total population 595,542 3,165,745 718,549
Uninsured population 493,389 2,115,620 674,771
Percentage uninsured (%) 82.85 66.83 93.91
Population density 26 people/km2 503 people/km2 22 people/km2
Socio-economic
Socio-economic quintile (SEQ)a 4 5 3
Rural vs. urban Rural Urban Rural
Health status
Crude death rate (per 1000 population) 3.6 4.7 4.6
HIV antenatal prevalence (15–49 years) 15.6 23.4 30.1
Incidence of TB (per 100,000 population) 806 351 511
Health service
PHC utilization rateb 2.41 1.64 2.78
PHC nurse clinical workloadc 25.3 36.7 34.6
PHC doctor clinical workload 26.5 29.1 34.5
No. of GPs contracted through model as of June 2016 14 87 29
Number of PHC health facilities 50 70 73
aThe SEQ is derived from the South African Index of Multiple Deprivation (SAIMD). SAIMD is a composite indicator of socio-economic status developed from
census data. It encompasses material, employment, educational and living environment deprivation. There are five SEQs based on a numeric SAIMD value with
SEQ 1 representing the most deprived and 5 the least deprived
bPHC utilization rate is the rate at which PHC services are utilized by the catchment population. It represents the average number of visits per person per year in
the catchment population with the denominator being a census-derived estimate. It is useful in determining the overall PHC utilization patterns and could be
specifically relevant in tracking equity in health service utilization
cThe PHC clinical workload is the average number of patients seen per health care worker (professional nurse or doctor) per clinical work day. These represent
health care workers employed within the public sector as opposed to those contracted-in to provide services
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Data collection
KII and FGD guides were created to conduct the inter-
views and discussions. These guides were developed
using key concepts identified in the literature and rele-
vant theoretical frameworks described above [30, 31].
Questions focused on: participants’ roles in relation to
the GPCI; policy origins and conceptualization; policy
content; the implementation process, including influen-
cing factors; and the actors involved, their experiences
and understanding of the GPCI, and the relationships
and interactions among them. The interview questions
were developed relative to the role of each type of
respondent. The interview guides were pilot tested prior
to data collection.
All KIIs and FGDs were conducted in English as all
respondents were conversant in English. KIIs were either
conducted face-to-face or telephonically where face-
to-face interviews were not possible. FGDs were all con-
ducted face-to-face. Interviews were recorded on a
digital analog recorder. Data were collected between
June 2016 and May 2017 jointly by the four authors
(LM, MB, AB and RE). Informed consent to conduct
and record each interview was obtained from each
participant. All interviews were transcribed verbatim.
Transcripts were anonymized and imported into QSR
NVIVO 11 for further coding.
Data analysis
A preliminary deductive codebook was developed
based on key factors in the two theoretical frame-
works [30, 31]. Initial codes were based on key fac-
tors identified in Liu’s conceptual framework [31].
These were then grouped into four overarching
groups (main codes) as per Walt and Gilson’s health
policy analysis triangle: policy content, process, con-
text and actors [30] as depicted in Table 3.
Data were coded and then summarized into matrices
by theme to allow for comparison of themes across
respondents and cases [34]. Findings were triangulated
across respondents and with data obtained from
document review. Data extracted from document review
were also used to triangulate and develop a timeline of
policy development, policy content, contract features,
processes and actors involved. Divergent themes were
discussed by the research team in-depth to explore nu-
ances within and between the cases. Themes from the
health policy analysis triangle [30] and Liu’s conceptual
framework on contracting-out [31] were used to explore
the factors influencing emergence of the contracting
models. In addition, themes from the latter framework
[31] were used to compare characteristics of contractual
arrangements in the three models.
Ethics
Ethical clearance for the study was obtained from the
University of Cape Town Human Research Ethics Com-
mittee (HREC 189/2015) and the WHO Ethics Review
Committee (ERC.0002661). In addition, permission to
conduct data collection was obtained from the relevant
Provincial Health Research Committees as per local
research requirements. Participation in the study was
voluntary and participants had the option to withdraw at
any time. Informed consent was obtained from all
participants prior to conducting the interviews. All iden-
tifiers were removed from transcripts to ensure partici-
pant confidentiality.
Results
In this section, we begin by describing the three models
of contracting-in (i.e. cases) in terms of how they func-
tion (Figs. 1, 2, and 3). Applying Liu’s conceptual frame-
work on contracting-out, we compare and contrast
characteristics of contractual arrangements in the three
models. Table 4 presents a timeline of key events in the
conceptualization and implementation of the GPCI
including the release of key policy documents that
underpinned the development of this initiative. We then
describe the inception and early emergence of the GPCI
in SA at a national level through the lens of the health
policy analysis triangle. We conclude by exploring three
Table 2 Profile of respondents and non-respondents by category
Category Number of respondents (n) Number of non-respondents (n)
KIIs
National level managers 9 3
Provincial and district level managers 17 2
General practitioners 30 0
Total number of respondents (KIIs) 56 5
FGDs
District FGD respondents 12 2
Total number of respondents (FGDs) 12 2
Total 68 7
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key factors underpinning the characteristics and evolu-
tion of the three contracting models using the lens of
the health policy analysis triangle and Liu’s conceptual
framework.
Three GPCI contracting-in models
This section describes each of the three contracting-in
models, to which we have assigned the following no-
menclature (1) a centralized-purchaser model, (2) a
decentralized-purchaser model and (3) a contracted-pur-
chaser model. For each model, we describe the pur-
chaser, contractual processes and main actors involved.
Key areas of variation in the models are: (1) The
purchaser – the party with whom the GP has a contrac-
tual agreement with; (2) level of involvement of national,
provincial and district actors in the contractual pro-
cesses such as recruitment, training, supervision and
monitoring of services (Table 5); and (3) the mechanism
through which funds are channeled from the purchaser
to the provider. All three models derive funding from
the same source, namely the national government.
Centralized-purchaser model
Figure 1 depicts the centralized-purchaser model. The
National Department of Health (NDOH) is the pur-
chaser and directly recruits and contracts the GPs.
Table 3 Overview of codes used in analysis
Policy content Policy process Actors Context
Sub-codes • Types of services
• Contract formality
• Contract duration
• Provider selection
• Provider payment mechanisms
• Performance requirements
• Motivation and incentive structures
• Extent of implementation
• Process of engagement
• Monitoring
• Provider-purchaser behavior
• Purchaser type
• Provider type
• Provider/ purchaser capacity
• Position (actor’s stance towards GPCI)
• Provider/ purchaser individual factors
• Provider/ purchaser level of power
• Relationship between the provider
and purchaser
• Structural contextual
factors
• Situational contextual
factors
• Cultural contextual factors
• Exogenous/ international
contextual factors
Fig. 1 Centralized-purchaser model.The NDOH as the purchaser directly recruits and contracts GPs. Contracts are signed by a district manager
(DM) an authorized signatory at NDOH. Placement, orientation, training, supervision and monitoring of GPs are done by staff at the district health
office (DHO). GPs provide PHC services to patients attending PHC clinics with day-to-day oversight from a Facility Manager (FM). GPs are paid
monthly by an external payroll company on behalf of the NDOH. This is effected on submission of a completed timesheet, signed and
verified by the FM, GPCI Coordinator and DM. The DM is the final signatory required to effect payment. The DHO compiles and submits
monthly and quarterly reports to the NDOH, containing information on the number of GPs appointed, hours worked and the estimated
number of patients seen per hour
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Other than recruitment, contracting and high-level over-
sight, involvement of national actors is minimal. Provin-
cial actors appear to be largely absent from the
implementation process in this model. On-the-ground
oversight and monitoring occurs primarily at the district
level. The district health office (DHO) is responsible for
GP placement, orientation, training, supervision and
monitoring of service provision. Actors involved in activ-
ities at this level typically include the district manager
(DM), a GPCI coordinator, a family physician and an
administration clerk. The GPCI coordinator is usually a
clinician manager who also has other responsibilities
within the district (such as overseeing other doctors
working within public sector health facilities). This is the
primary individual responsible for overseeing all GPCI
activities within the district. Other individuals within the
DHO provide support as determined by the DHO man-
agement team. Payment to the GPs is effected monthly
by an external payroll company upon submission of
approved timesheets.
Contracted-purchaser model
Figure 2 illustrates the contracted-purchaser model in
which the purchaser is an independent Service Provider
(SP) contracted to manage the implementation of the
GPCI on behalf of the MOH. The SP is responsible for
advertisement, recruitment, contracting, supervision,
monitoring and payment of the GPs.
Unlike in the centralized-purchaser model, where the
DHO is responsible for oversight at district level, in this
model oversight is done primarily by a district-based
support partner (DSP). The DSP is a sub-contracted
district-based organization that is funded to support
local health system strengthening. The DSP is respon-
sible for orientation, training, supervision, monitoring
and performance management of the GPs. In this model,
Fig. 2 Contracted-purchaser model.The purchaser is an independent Service Provider (SP) contracted to manage implementation of the GPCI on
behalf of the MOH. The SP - a large South African health not-for-profit organization with a national footprint – sub-contracts a variety of
organizations which assume different roles in the contract management process. These organizations act as a Consortium, which is responsible
for advertisement, recruitment, contracting, supervision, monitoring and payment. Recruited GPs are contracted directly by the SP, and their
contracts are signed by the GP and an authorized signatory of the SP. Once a GP is appointed, the SP liaises with the DHO to determine a facility
for placement. A district-based support partner (DSP) in each district – a sub-contracted district-based organization which is funded to support
local health system strengthening – is then responsible for orientation, training, supervision, monitoring and performance management of the
GPs. At a facility level, the FM is responsible for overseeing daily activities. GPs are paid monthly upon submission of a timesheet that is verified
and co-signed by the FM, an authorized representative of the DSP and the SP’s project manager at the national office. The timesheets are then
submitted to the SP’s finance department for verification and payment. The SP submits monthly and quarterly performance reports to the NDOH
Mureithi et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2018) 17:107 Page 7 of 18
the DHO’s involvement is limited to determining place-
ment at a facility level. The DM, GPCI coordinator and
family physician may liaise with the DSP on matters of
clinical governance or as the need arises. As with the
centralized-purchaser model, GPs are paid monthly on
submission of a completed verified timesheet.
Decentralized-purchaser model
Figure 3 illustrates the decentralized-purchaser model,
in which the provincial department of health (PDOH) is
the purchaser using funds disbursed by the National
Treasury (NT). Provincial and district health departments
develop annual business plans that outline the proposed
total number of hours contracted GPs will work, including
a budget and monitoring framework against which
performance is measured. The business plan requires
approval from the NDOH annually. GPs are contracted
directly by the PDOH, represented by the DHO.
Actors involved in implementation within the DHO
include the DM, GPCI coordinator, administration clerk,
monitoring and evaluation officer, human resource and
finance department staff members. At the inception of
Fig. 3 Decentralized-purchaser model.The provincial department of health (PDOH) is the purchaser. The GP enters a contract with the PDOH
represented by the DHO, and the contract is signed by the GP and DM (as a representative of the PDOH). Recruitment and placement are done
by the sub-district health office in conjunction with the DHO. The sub-district manager (SDM) is responsible for orientation, training, supervision
and monitoring of GPs. GPs provide PHC services to patients attending PHC clinics with day-to-day oversight from a Facility Manager (FM). GPs
are placed on the DHO payroll and paid at the end of the month based on the number of hours indicated in the contract. The GPs complete
monthly timesheets that are in turn verified and signed by the FM, SDM, GPCI Coordinator and DM. These timesheets are not used to effect
payment, but rather as an oversight mechanism to confirm the number of hours worked. The sub-district health office compiles and submits
monthly and quarterly reports to the DHO and PDOH for review and submission to the NDOH
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this model, the DHO led recruitment, placement, orien-
tation and training of GPs with input from the
sub-district manager (SDM). The DHO and the SDM
were responsible for placing the doctor at an appropriate
PHC facility. Supervision and monitoring were then
conducted by the SDM. Over time, as the SDMs adapted
to the process, most activities were transferred to the
SDM with oversight from the DHO.
In contrast to the other two models, in the
decentralized-purchaser model, GPs are paid in the same
manner as public sector-employed doctors working in
the district. The contracted GPs are placed on the DHO
Table 4 Timeline of key events in emergence of GPCI (2010–2017)
Year Event Key actors involved
1994 African National Congress Health Plan released African National Congress
(ruling party)
1997 White Paper for Transformation of the Health System released Ministry of Health
2003 National Health Act (2003) Ministry of Health
2010 PHC re-engineering discussion document released Ministry of Health
August 2011 NHI Green Paper released Ministry of Health
March 2012 10 NHI pilot districts announced Ministry of Health
April 2012 NHI piloting in 10 selected districts commences
2011–2012 National Technical Task Team (NTTT) constituted to drive
GP contracting initiative
National policymakers, NTTT, provincial,
district NHI coordinators, academics,
representatives of professional associations
2012–2013 Policy intent and contracting model finalized
(centralized-purchaser model)
National policymakers
Ministerial roadshows held to engage with relevant stakeholders
and promote buy-in for NHI and the GPCI
Minister of Health
February 2013 PDOH announces intention to pursue decentralized-purchaser
model in the selected pilot district
PDOH, District level managers
2013 Centralized-purchaser model in implemented in selected districts
Independent payroll company contracted to manage the payroll
process at national level (centralized-purchaser model)
National policymakers, provincial, district
level managers, facility managers GPs
National policymakers
July 2013 Decentralized-purchaser model is implemented in one pilot district Provincial, district and sub-district managers,
facility managers, GPs
Early 2014 Decision taken by NDOH to pursue a contracted-purchaser model National policymakers
November 2014 Service provider appointed and contracted to recruit, place and
manage GPs (contracted-purchaser model)
Contracted-purchaser model is implemented in selected districts
National policymakers
December 2016 Draft NHI White Paper is released for public consultation Ministry of Health
June 2017 NHI White Paper is released Ministry of Health
Source: Document review and interview data
Table 5 Involvement of actors in contractual processes, by level of health system and case
Model Centralized-purchaser model Decentralized-purchaser model Contracted-purchaser model
Level of health system N P D SD F O N P D SD F O N P D SD F O
Aspect of contractual process
Recruitment ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Contracting ✓ ✓ ✓
Placement ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Orientation and training ✓ ✓ ✓
Supervision and monitoring ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Timesheets ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Payment ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
Reporting ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓
N National, P Province, D District, SD Sub-district, F Facility, O Other (External service provider)
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payroll and paid at the end of the month based on the
number of hours indicated in the contracts. Timesheets
are an oversight mechanism to confirm the number of
hours worked but are not used to effect payment. The
DM has the authority to stop monthly payments if a
doctor does not work the number of hours required in
the contract.
Common features
In all three models, placements are determined by the
DHO based on service needs and the FM is responsible
for overseeing daily activities at the facility. Monthly and
quarterly reports are submitted to the NDOH as part of
the monitoring process. With the exception of the
decentralized-purchaser model, provincial actors are min-
imally involved in contract management and oversight.
Characteristics of contractual arrangements of the three
models
Aspects of the contracts’ characteristics evolved as the
GPCI models did. Thus despite the similarities among
the models, distinct differences have emerged. Based on
Liu’s framework we outlined the features of the purchaser
and provider types, and each type’s financial and manager-
ial capacities across the three models (Additional file 1).
Table 6 outlines the characteristics of the contractual
arrangements in each model, as per Liu’s framework. In all
models, GPs are expected to deliver the full spectrum of
PHC services and adhere to local public sector guidelines
and practices. Their other functions include clinical men-
toring, training and support of other health care workers
within the facility, as well as clinical governance and
quality assurance (QA). Under the contracted-purchaser
model, the QA functions are better defined and the GPs
are expected to participate in facility-based QA activities.
All three contracting models are formal and legally-binding
in terms of formality; the contracted-purchaser contract
outlines performance requirements in the most detail and
is therefore the most classical of the three contracts. Of
note, however, the decentralized-purchaser model also has
aspects that are more relational due to its decentralized
management and because the local purchaser has built
trust with the GPs over many years. Performance
monitoring under the decentralized-purchaser model
is also done at a sub-district level. Importantly,
although the Ministry’s intention was to have a clas-
sical complete and legally-binding contract, this has
proven challenging to enforce. At present, perform-
ance management of individual GPs is restricted to
monitoring attendance as prescribed in the contract.
Monitoring the quality of services has yet to be im-
plemented except in the contracted-purchaser model.
Inception and early emergence of the GP contracting-in
initiative at a national level
This section describes the early emergence of the
GPCI using the health policy analysis triangle as a
lens. The inception of the GPCI can be traced over
a seven-year period (highlighted in Table 4, which
presents events in the introduction, emergence and
early implementation of the initiative). The early
emergence and establishment of the three models
can be traced over a period of 4 years (2011 to
2014), between the release of the NHI Green Paper
and initial implementation in selected NHI pilot
districts.
Context
The first component of the health policy triangle model
is the context in which it is exists. Beginning in 1994,
the newly elected political establishment set out to ad-
dress the legacy of the inequities of apartheid. A series
of high-level policies were outlined in key policy docu-
ments and legislation, including the White Paper for
Transformation of the Health System (1997) [35],
PHC re-engineering document (2010) [36], Negotiated
Service Delivery Agreement (2009) [23] and National
Development Plan (2011) [37]. These efforts sought
to restructure and unify a previously fragmented pub-
lic health sector, expand access to health care, and
improve health system management. Implementing
NHI as a financing mechanism to enable achievement
of UHC has been a cornerstone of the ruling party’s
political manifesto since it came into power in 1994
[38]. Between 1994 and 2009, a series of high-level
committees were set up to investigate the feasibility
of introducing a NHI programme. Their findings
paved the way for the development of the NHI policy
documents (NHI Green and White Papers) [4, 5, 22].
High-level political will to address past inequities
helped propel NHI onto the policy agenda, as it rep-
resented one of the mechanisms to redress structural
imbalances. Reforms were centered around a renewed
commitment to PHC and a shift in health service
provision focus from a hospital-centered model to a
more preventive and PHC-oriented approach.
GP contracting-in is considered the fourth arm of
the PHC re-engineering strategy, which aimed at
strengthening the PHC platform. This included focus-
ing on increasing access to and coverage of PHC
through drawing on the pool of private GPs who typ-
ically serve the smaller insured population and are
primarily located in urban areas. The intended recipi-
ents of health services provided by the contracted
GPs were patients accessing public sector PHC clinics
in rural or semi-rural districts.
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Actors
The second component of the health policy triangle is
the actors involved. Conceptualization of the GPCI was
primarily a nationally-driven process. The development
of the NHI policy and the GPCI was largely driven by
high-level policy elites, including the Minister of Health.
A National Technical Task Team (NTTT) for GP con-
tracting was set up in 2011 following the initial NHI
Green Paper. Chaired by a high-level national policy-
maker, the NTTT included other high-level national pol-
icymakers, provincial and district level managers and
NHI coordinators. NHI coordinators were appointed by
the MOH to provide oversight for all NHI implementa-
tion initiatives, including the GPCI. Other NTTT partic-
ipants included academics and representatives of
professional associations. Some interview respondents
suggested that the representatives of professional associ-
ations may not have been representative of all GPs or
that information from the negotiations did not cascade
down to all GPs; these gaps are evident in subsequent
dissatisfaction with the remuneration rates. Given the
intention to address inequities, policymakers also in-
cluded representatives from a rural health advocacy
group to ensure consideration of rural contexts.
“We also have a task team that is set for the GPs,
because remember when we implemented this
[GPCI]..…no structures existed.…In terms of the
[National Treasury] grant framework, we had to
ensure that we had a technical task team that would
look at the GP contracting. We would look at
implementation, M&E, any issues, anything regarding
the GPs, we would then handle it in that sort of task
team.” (National level manager 2).
Despite its attempts to be inclusive, facility managers
and GPs appear to have been largely absent from this
initial process. Neither the criteria for inclusion in this
NTTT nor the process of its constitution were made
clear in the interviews. The high-level policymakers were
able to exercise their power in the process through
decision-making at various points in the policy develop-
ment process. These included among others setting the
policy agenda, constituting the NTTT and overseeing
funding disbursements. This largely top-down policy
process may have resulted in the lack of a sense of own-
ership by the GPCI implementers and providers, eventu-
ally leading to implementation gaps.
Policy content
The policy’s content forms the third component of the
triangle. The NHI Green Paper provided early guidance
in terms of preparation of the health system for eventual
introduction of NHI. It proposed that contracted private
practitioners deliver PHC services within a specific dis-
trict and suggested establishing a District Health Au-
thority to be responsible for contracting with the NHI to
purchase the services of private providers [4]. Import-
antly, the decision to choose a contracting-in as opposed
to contracting-out model was driven by various factors.
As noted, a key intention underpinning the initiative was
to improve access to PHC services particularly in rural
and geographically remote areas. Our interviews con-
firmed that the lack of human resources, specifically
doctors in rural clinic settings, and overburdening of
hospitals contributed to the conceptualization of the
GPCI in its current form. Another intention of the GPCI
was to rouse confidence in the public sector by ensuring
availability of doctors at health facilities. One interviewee
described the intention thus:
“So the purpose of this [GPCI] was to test modalities
for gaining better access to doctors at PHC level, thus
improving the quality of clinical care at PHC level
and increasing patient confidence in PHC services. So,
to stop the bypassing of PHC facilities to hospitals
because hospital services are more expensive services,
so you go towards implementing the NHI.” (National
level manager 5).
Further, the public sector is primarily a nurse-led sys-
tem. Contracting-in doctors was also considered to be a
way that would not only provide much-needed services,
but would also provide support to overwhelmed PHC
nurses through mentorship and access to immediate re-
ferral pathways. One respondent commented:
“So the one [benefit] would be quality assurance,
teaching and training, referral for those patients who
need to be referred and be appropriately seen by a
doctor, and injecting confidence into a nurse-based pri-
mary health care system.” (National level manager 4).
Interviewees reported that during initial discussions
both contracting-in and contracting-out options were
considered. The potential challenges with monitoring
outputs and quality of services provided by doctors in
their own practices led to the choice of contracting-in.
The contracting-in option thus also sought to ensure
that GPs would follow national treatment guidelines and
policies, rather than subsidizing non-standardized care
in their own private practices, as two respondents
highlighted.
“We had a very intense debate at the early days of
whether it would be contracting-in or contracting-out.
I recall meeting with [high-level policy officials], and in
the first meeting of the GP contracting task team, the
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very first was…speaking about both models [contracting-
in and contracting-out].” (National level manager 9)
“Quality [of services] in GP practices pervasively is not
what we expected to be either, and many of the GPs in
SA are out of touch with clinical guidelines as
developed….If we had contracted out, you simply send
your patients to the doctors to do what they always do.
But bringing the doctors into the public sector facilities
was also a way of getting them to conform to public
sector guidelines.” (National level manager 5).
Although the intention to pilot contracting of GPs was
outlined in the NHI Green Paper, at the time the study
was conducted there was no policy document available
specific to the GPCI that outlined the content, processes
and actors to be involved in implementation, as one re-
spondent mentioned.
“I can’t remember if I saw a document specifically
outlining [GPCI]. I think it was more in discussion.”
(District A manager 6).
Documents such as contract templates, timesheets and
monitoring reports were nonetheless available.
As the GPCI is an NHI pilot initiative, it receives fund-
ing from a single source: an NHI conditional grant from
the National Treasury (NT) that was created to support
the first phase of the NHI roll-out in 2012/13. Condi-
tional grants are financial allocations from the NT to ei-
ther national or provincial government departments that
may only be used for a specific designated purpose.
Funds are therefore administered by the NDOH and
need to comply with stipulated reporting requirements.
With the exception of the decentralized-purchaser
model, provincial health departments have little to no
autonomy in managing funds disbursed for the GPCI.
GPs contracted into the services were to be paid a speci-
fied fee-per-hour (session) worked in a facility. The
number of hours a GP works at a facility can differ, de-
termined by the need in the facility as well as the time
the doctor has available. The number of hours the GP
worked was to be negotiated between each GP and the
purchaser.
Policy process
The final component of the health policy triangle is the
process by which policies are elaborated. Following the
release of the NHI Green Paper, eleven pilot districts
were selected where innovations for health system re-
form, such as GPCI, would be tested and evaluated. The
NTTT’s initial purpose was to deliberate the pros and
cons of various contracting options, and to conceptualize
a contracting model to pilot. Once the model of
contracting-in was decided on, the NTTT became respon-
sible for monitoring implementation against set targets
and providing timely feedback on the process as it
occurred.
“When it [NTTT] started, it was a monthly meeting.
So they [NTTT members] were coming to report and
then we’ll agree on things that are not going well and
trying to make sure things are working. So that body
(or that task team) was making sure things are being
implemented the way they are supposed to be
implemented.” (National level manager 1).
Concurrently, the Minister of Health embarked on a
series of “national roadshows” (or public campaigns) in
the selected pilot districts aimed at raising awareness
around NHI and garnering interest in the GPCI
among local GPs. Targeted participants in these
activities included district and provincial managers,
GPs and other health practitioners, local councillors,
NGOs, academics, and representatives of professional
associations.
Factors influencing emergence of the three contracting
models
In this section we reflect on the factors that influenced
the emergence of the three GPCI models during the
early implementation phase. The three main factors we
identified were: (1) the decision to pilot the imple-
mentation of the GPCI; (2) the financial management
capacity; and (3) the managerial capacity of the
national, provincial and district actors involved in
implementation.
Piloting as the model for early implementation
The decision to pilot implementation of the initiative
was a key factor facilitating the emergence of the three
GPCI models. Piloting allowed for flexibility in the im-
plementation process, enabling course corrections in re-
sponse to challenges that emerged during the early
implementation phase. One respondent described pilot-
ing as a fluid process, with changes made depending on
what worked and what did not.
“As a pilot you want to know what will work what will
not work. We needed to start somewhere. Then after
starting at that point, there will be some suggestions
coming in and then we will change as it comes.
Because if people are coming with suggestions, why not
change? If there is something that is not working, why
not drop it? So that’s how it worked, and even that’s
how it is still working. So if you see that something was
not part of the plan and we think it will work, why not
include it?” (National level manager 1)
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The flexibility enabled through piloting also created
greater scope for provincial autonomy, thereby facilitat-
ing the emergence of the decentralized-purchaser model.
This was further legitimized by existing legislation that
enabled a level of provincial-led decision-making. High-
level provincial and district actors in the decentralized
model decided to build on their existing local model of
contracting non-state providers rather than opting for
the nationally-driven contracting model. Thus following
the initial ministerial roadshows, the proposed contracting-
in model was adapted to suit the local context and experi-
ence, while complying with the reporting requirements
stipulated by the funding source. Building on existing local
models and approaches also facilitated the emergence of a
more relational contract in the decentralized model, in
which mutual trust is a central principle. Provincial leaders
also saw this as an extension of their existing engage-
ment with private sector providers. The decision to
adopt decentralized models was thus made at the out-
set of the GPCI and the province never adopted a
centralized version of the GPCI.
Flexibility during piloting also resulted in changes to
the contractual characteristics. For example, changes to
the provider payment mechanisms in the centralized
and decentralized purchaser models were made to en-
sure timely payments to providers. Although driven by
other factors related to financial and managerial compe-
tencies (discussed below), the decision to pilot enabled
easier implementation adaptations.
However, despite the flexibility created by piloting, a
few respondents felt piloting might have been inad-
equate and that more emphasis could have been placed
on testing alternative contracting models during this
early implementation phase. In particular, different con-
tractual characteristics could have been tried.
“Piloting has a particular meaning and we haven’t
actually piloted anything yet, in the real sense of
piloting. Piloting means testing new concepts and ideas
and evaluating them on small scale for potential
scaling up….It’s testing these approaches – of
capitation, of pay-for-performance and the like.”
(National level manager 3)
“It [GPCI] was introduced as a concept to be piloted
and I think it did serve its purpose as a pilot to
demonstrate what the problems were and where the
problems were and what are the things we need to do
to change.… At this stage, I would say it can no longer
be considered a pilot. It should be considered as a
policy direction, where we identified where the
challenges are. And we are now implementing
it with lessons learnt from the pilot.” (National
level manager 4)
Financial management capacity
GPCI’s reliance on a centralized funding source – the
NHI conditional grant administered through the na-
tional MoH – resulted in the development of stringent
mechanisms for monitoring GPs’ attendance at clinics,
including registers and timesheets, to ensure compliance
with NT reporting and payment mechanisms.
At the inception of the centralized-purchaser model,
all payments were processed by the finance unit within
the national MoH. However, lack of financial manage-
ment capacity and bureaucratic inefficiencies led to de-
lays in payments, and this function was eventually
outsourced to an independent payroll company.
“It was initially done by NDoH and that’s when there
was a problem and then that’s when we contracted
[payroll company]….But they [payroll company] didn’t
start with it [GPCI]. They came later due to challenges
that we were having at the [national] department.”
(National level manager 1)
Within the decentralized-purchaser model, the provider
payment mechanism was adapted to match local finan-
cial practices and past institutional (provincial and dis-
trict) experience with paying contracted providers. GPs
were placed onto the district payroll and paid a specified
monthly amount based on the number of hours stipu-
lated in their contracts. Monthly timesheets were used
to verify hours worked. The decision to place the GPs
on the payroll and to pay them monthly was aimed at
improving the payment process and easing the financial
management burden on the district staff. More specific-
ally, district management sought to eliminate the risk of
late payments which could occur as a result of the time
it took to sign the timesheets in order to effect pay-
ments, and the possible negative effect this could have
on their relationship with local GPs.
Managerial capacity
At GPCI’s inception, the choice of contracting-in (versus
out) of GPs was linked to the need to closely monitor
the quality of services provided to patients accessing
public sector PHC facilities. The contract design, and
the choice of monitoring through monthly timesheets
were intended to ensure that the state could monitor
outputs and control provider behavior by only paying
GPs for hours worked.
“No it wasn’t just logistical, it was a fear that the
department will not be able to manage the risk of any
fraudulent activity.” (National level manager 3)
Requiring contracted GPs to follow the public sector’s
Standard Treatment Guidelines was also intended to
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ensure their integration into existing service delivery
platforms.
Another key factor that drove the emergence of the
contracted-purchaser model was the managerial
challenge faced by the Ministry in all areas of the GPCI:
recruitment, contracting, training, monitoring and
supervision of the GPs. As the MoH was unable to man-
age these processes and meet recruitment targets, out-
sourcing these functions to an external SP represented a
good alternative.
“Clearly I think there were insufficient people here [at
national level] to deal with it [GPCI], in terms of
administration, for contracting and all of that.”
(National level manager 3)
Both province and district systems endeavored to inte-
grate the GPs into the existing service delivery platform.
The decentralized-purchaser model emerged in response
to the provincial authorities’ need to more tightly con-
trol the GPCI. The provinces’ prior experience in man-
aging external providers was also a motivating factor,
and systems were already in place to effectively manage
these GPs.
“We just thought that it was better to have control,
who works where, and what they should do, rather
than having an external driver doing the contracting.
And as they explained the previous experience…we
just wanted the full control over the process.”
(District A manager 5)
Discussion
The three GPCI models described emerged from an ini-
tiative that piloted contracting GPs into the public
health service in SA. The models represent three differ-
ent types of purchasers: (1) the central Ministry of
Health, which directly contracts GPs and manages the
contract; (2) a contracted SP that reports to the Ministry
while directly contracting GPs and sub-contracting with
a variety of organizations that assume various roles (e.g.
recruitment); and (3) a province that has decentralized
the contracting process to the district and the
sub-district levels, while providing high-level oversight.
Our study aim was to draw lessons for future policy-
making and health system strengthening to attain UHC
by using NHI as the financing mechanism. This paper’s
exploration of the three GPCI pilot models reveals
important lessons. First, piloting promoted flexibility in
implementation and allowed the GPCI to be shaped by
the various contexts and actors to meet local needs.
While contract characteristics should be well-defined,
implementation should be flexible and tailored to the
local setting. Among the study respondents, however,
discordant views were expressed about the adequacy of
piloting of the initiative, with some describing piloting
as ongoing and others voicing the need to further test
out alternative models. This may point to a lack of con-
sensus among the actors on the nature and degree of
piloting. It also resonates with the recommendation by
Heard et al. to pilot contracting on a “meaningful scale”
to build experience and capacity within the government
with the ultimate aim of improving engagement with
non-state providers [39].
Second, flexibility creates opportunities to recognize
and enable local capacity to effect policy implementation.
The evolution from the initial centralized-purchaser
model to a contracted-purchaser model, due to human re-
source limitations and financial management challenges,
is one example. This created opportunities for the SP and
its consortium of organizations to assume a primary pur-
chasing role. Third, management capacity was a key factor
influencing the emergence of the GPCI models and subse-
quent implementation. The importance of management
capacity in contracting with non-state providers in
LMICs has likewise been highlighted in previous stud-
ies [31, 40–42]. Where capacity existed and policy
actors leveraged the province’s autonomy to imple-
ment the decentralized-purchaser model, decentralized
GPCI management was selected as the approach. Im-
portantly, this decision appeared to be largely driven
by existing institutional experience and systems for
non-state provider contracting, and thus the prov-
ince’s confidence that this could be best managed
locally. This points to the importance of delegating
decision-making and empowering actors at a local
level and emphasizes the interaction between institu-
tional capacities, decision space and accountability, as
suggested by Bossert and Mitchell [43].
A notable area of uncertainty is the role played by pro-
vincial health departments in the emergence of the GPCI.
With the exception of the decentralized-purchaser model
(where provincial-level actors and processes played a crit-
ical role in enabling and facilitating a decentralized
model), provincial health departments were minimally in-
volved in the evolutionary process. Given the structure of
the South African health system, as well as the legislated
autonomy of the provinces, their absence from the GPCI’s
development has implications for future buy-in and sus-
tainability of the GPCI, and other efforts to contract pri-
vate providers into the public sector. Provincial roles are
however not clearly articulated in the White Paper [22],
with most responsibilities and activities proposed to be lo-
cated at the district level.
In this paper we did not set out to make judgements on
the success or failures of the various models or their evo-
lutionary processes– an assessment of the implementation
Mureithi et al. International Journal for Equity in Health  (2018) 17:107 Page 15 of 18
of the GPCI pilot will be presented elsewhere. What we
sought to illustrate was that establishing this form of en-
gagement with non-state providers: (1) is a large and
resource-intensive undertaking; (2) must be determined
by local context; (3) needs to account for a people-centred
approach to health care; and (4) requires significant finan-
cial and general management capacity, resources and
experience.
Lessons gleaned from the GPCI’s evolution will be use-
ful as SA includes non-state PHC providers into the
public sector realm in the ongoing drive to implement
NHI. The recently-released White Paper for NHI in SA
articulates a vision of a publicly-administered National
Health Insurance Fund (NHIF) that is a strategic
single-purchaser, a single-payer and reports to the Min-
ister of Health. This includes a specific contracting unit
to be located within the NHIF. Both contracting-in and
out will be options for engaging private practitioners to
work in PHC settings to provide services based on need.
These providers will be remunerated on a risk-adjusted
capitation basis, frequently evaluated and monitored and
receive additional remuneration based on performance.
Practitioners will be expected to meet appropriate
professional requirements as a prerequisite to being
contracted. The White Paper further envisages that a
Contracting Unit for Primary Health Care (CUP) will be
located at district level to contract and manage GPs.
Importantly, the White Paper expresses the govern-
ment’s commitment to test out various implementation
approaches and learn from these activities [22].
Lessons learned from this study suggest that as NHI is
rolled out, the SA National government should imple-
ment and test contracting approaches. The evidence
presented here suggests that flexibility and tailoring to
local contexts and capacities is beneficial, and that a
one-size-fits-all approach should not be considered. This
study also supports a more decentralized, as opposed to
centralized, approaches.
Further, to implement closely-monitored GP contracts
using decentralized CUPs will undoubtedly require
well-resourced services, well-functioning systems, and
capacitated staff. Given the importance of management
capacity on the emergence of GPCI, an a priori assess-
ment of the state’s management capacity should be an
integral part of any future contracting initiatives with
non-state providers (NSPs) [42]. Successful contract
management has been linked to external management
support [44], suggesting that provision of additional
management support should be a consideration for
future contracting initiatives. This study supports this,
highlighting the importance of strong oversight such as
a strong provincial team that supports lower-level imple-
mentation and facilitates decision-making as required.
The national Ministry of Health should therefore ensure
that local-level administrative structures are ready to
implement and relevant staff are appropriately capaci-
tated. Thus flexibility and willingness to implement a
contracting model when districts are fully capacitated
are paramount.
Strengths and limitations
This is one of the first studies to describe the GPCI
models in detail and chart their emergence at a national
level. Its strength lies in the inclusion of multiple per-
spectives, including national, provincial and district
managers, independent service providers and GPs. This
enabled triangulation of the data from document reviews
with interviews from actors involved in the initiative at
various levels of the health system.
Nevertheless, we acknowledge several limitations of
the study. First, the study only included three districts.
Thus it may not be appropriate to generalize our find-
ings to other districts in SA, which has diverse regional
contexts. Nonetheless, we found valuable insights on the
GPCI emergence and implementation and believe it
would be useful to utilize these when examining the
initiative in other settings. Second, the inception of the
GPCI occurred over a seven-year period (between 2010
and 2017) with the three models emerging between 2011
and 2014. During and since that time, the initiative has
undergone changes in leadership at the national level
and a lack of involvement of provincial managers in
high-level policy decisions on the nature of contracting.
Furthermore, few documents exist that articulate the
policies. We were therefore unable to elucidate or verify
some of the early events in the inception of the GPCI
following the release of the NHI Green Paper and the
decision to choose a contracting-in model.
Lastly, our study did not specifically aim to include fa-
cility managers as respondents. Future studies on subse-
quent implementation of the GPCI including the
perspectives of facility managers could provide add-
itional insights into on-the-ground implementation and
interactions between GPs and other cadres of health care
workers in SA’s traditionally nurse-led PHC facilities. Fu-
ture publications emanating from the broader study of
which this paper is a component will present factors that
influenced implementation of the GPCI pilot to date.
Conclusions
In summary, the three GPCI models that emerged essen-
tially represented iterations of the centralized-purchaser
model. Emergence of other two models were strongly
influenced by purchasers’ capacity to manage contracts,
payments and recruitment processes. Findings from the
decentralized-purchaser model show the importance of
local contexts, provincial capacity and experience in in-
fluencing the evolution of the models. Contract formality
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differed slightly by model, influenced by context and
type of purchaser. Our key lesson is that even as con-
tract characteristics need to be well-defined, adaptability
to the local context and capacity is critical. Purchaser
capacity, existing systems, institutional knowledge and
experience in the area of contracting and financial man-
agement should all be considered before adopting a
decentralized implementation approach to contracting
with NSPs. These findings present important consider-
ations for the future roll out and success of NHI in SA.
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